Interstate risk sharing in Germany: 1970-2006 by Hepp, Ralf & von Hagen, Jürgen
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Hepp, Ralf; von Hagen, Jürgen
Working Paper
Interstate risk sharing in Germany:
1970-2006
ZEI-working paper, No. B 03-2010
Provided in cooperation with:
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Suggested citation: Hepp, Ralf; von Hagen, Jürgen (2010) : Interstate risk sharing in Germany:













Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Ralf Hepp and Jürgen von Hagen

















University of Bonn, Indiana University Kelley School of Business, and CEPR  
 
 




We study the channels of interstate risk sharing in Germany for the time 
period 1970 to 2006 following the methodology of Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
Their framework allows us to estimate the degree of smoothing of a shock to 
a state’s gross domestic product by factor markets, the government sector, 
and credit markets, respectively. For the time period from 1970 to 1994 – 
pre-unification Germany – we find that about 19 percent of shocks to a state’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) are smoothed by private factor markets, 50 
percent are smoothed by the German government sector, and a further 17 
percent are smoothed through credit markets. For the post-reunification 
period, 1995 to 2006, the relative importance of the smoothing channels 
changes. In the complete sample, factor markets contribute around 50.5 
percent to consumption smoothing, and credit markets contribute another 
17.5 percent. The government sector’s role is diminished: it smoothes around 
10 percent of a shock. For this period, we also split our sample between West 
and East German states. In West Germany, 63 percent of idiosyncratic 
income shocks are smoothed out by factor markets; and another 15 percent by 
the government sector. In East Germany, factor markets smooth about 34.5 
percent of the volatility in state GDP, the government sector about 19 
percent, and another 18 percent are smoothed by credit markets. 
 
•  Keywords: Regional Risk-sharing, Factor Markets, Consumption 
Smoothing, Fiscal Federalism 
•  JEL Codes: H77, E63, F42  
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  1  Introduction 
The stability of an economic union such as a federation or a large state depends crucially on its 
capacity to deal with idiosyncratic shocks to regional output. In a world with perfect asset markets, 
such shocks do not matter much, as consumers in all regions of the union can insure themselves 
against them. With imperfect asset markets, however, other channels of interregional risk sharing 
move to the forefront. Apart from capital markets, labor markets provide opportunities for risk 
sharing, if workers residing in one region can work and earn incomes in another region. Credit 
market can provide opportunities for borrowing and lending across regions and, thus, consumption 
smoothing. Finally, the public sector can contribute to interregional risk sharing if a negative shock 
to the income of one region triggers transfers payments either horizontally from other regions or 
vertically from the central government offsetting the impact of the original shock. 
Empirical research on interregional risk sharing has concentrated mostly on the US and Canada.
3 
In an influential study, Asdrubali et al. (1996) [henceforth, ASY] measure the (relative) 
importance of the three channels of risk sharing among the states of the US. They find that, for the 
period from 1963 to 1990, 39 percent of idiosyncratic shocks to the gross state product of US 
states are smoothed by capital markets, 13 percent by federal fiscal transfers, and 23 percent by 
credit markets.
4 Their results were largely confirmed by Mélitz and Zumer (1998) who also 
perform a number of methodological robustness checks. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998) 
disregard the potential of credit markets for risk sharing and find that capital markets and the 
public sector smooth 35 and 10 percent of state-specific shocks in the US, respectively. Del Negro 
(2002) points out that these estimates might be upwards biased due to measurement errors in state-
level data. 
Bayoumi and Klein (1997) use Canadian provincial trade-balance data to determine the degree risk 
sharing within Canada and between Canada and other OECD countries.
5 They find a high degree 
of risk sharing among Canadian provinces but little risk sharing across international borders. In a 
similar vein, Crucini (1999) finds substantial risk sharing among Canadian provinces and U.S. 
States; but a much lower degree of risk sharing between these and other countries. Ostergaard et al. 
(2002) also use U.S. and Canadian data to focus on the consumption-smoothing role of credit 
markets. They find that both U.S. states and Canadian provinces achieve some, but not full 
consumption smoothing through credit markets. Del Negro (2002) also questions findings of 
considerable interstate risk sharing in some of the earlier literature due to lack of corrections for 
measurement errors. He extends the Hess and Shin (1998) data and uses a factor model to 
determine the degree of risk-sharing among U.S. states. He finds that the quantity anomaly holds 
for U.S. states after correcting for measurement error in the consumption and output data.  
                                                           
3 A closely related literature in international finance deals with consumption and output risk-sharing at the 
international level. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the empirical international literature a lack of consumption risk-
sharing: cross-border consumption correlations are typically lower than the corresponding output correlations. This 
empirical regularity has been dubbed the “quantity anomaly” [see, for example, Backus et al. (1992), Baxter and 
Crucini (1993), Obstfeld (1994)]. Contrary to most other studies, Hess and Shin (1998) find that the quantity anomaly 
is present at the national level in the US as well. 
4 Asdrubali and Kim (2004) find similar results for US states; however, when they look at OECD countries and at the 
EU15, the results are markedly different: Capital markets and international transfers play almost no role, only credit 
markets do and they contribute about 22 percent to consumption smoothing. 
5 As pointed out by Sorensen and Yosha (2000), Bayoumi and Klein's estimation does not distinguish between the 
three separate smoothing channels. 3 
The capacity to provide interregional risk sharing has also been investigated for several other 
countries.
6 Mélitz and Zumer (1998) find that the degree of risk sharing provided by capital 
markets in the UK and Italy is similar to the US, while risk sharing operating through the public 
sector and credit markets is very low or even nonexistent. There are also a few studies focusing on 
risk-sharing in Germany. Büttner (1999, 2002) uses the methodology of ASY, but focuses 
exclusively on the effectiveness of the fiscal system of West Germany to smooth state income, not 
state output, for the 1970 to 1997 time period. The fiscal channel considers the smoothing effects 
of fiscal transfers mandated by the fiscal equalization system, of federal taxes, of contributions and 
transfers from the mandatory pension system, and of the unemployment insurance. Büttner finds 
that the German fiscal system smoothes only around 15 percent of a shock to state income, with 
about 6 percent coming from the fiscal equalization system. Kellermann (2001) looks at German 
data for the same time period, 1970 to 1997. However, she distinguishes between pre- and post-
unification data. The sample from 1970 to 1990 (“pre-unification”) includes only the 10 states of 
the former West Germany; the sample from 1992 to 1997 (“post-unification”) includes all 16 states 
of unified Germany. She finds that the fiscal system smoothes over 40 percent of shocks to state 
income. Additionally, private capital markets smooth out about 30 percent of such shocks. In the 
post-unification data, the role of private capital markets in consumption smoothing is drastically 
reduced (to 7 and 1 percent, respectively).
7 Kellermann does not consider ex-post smoothing 
through credit markets. In a more recent study, Jüßen (2006) investigates risk sharing in post-
unification Germany, using a modified version of ASY’s methodology. His data set is very 
disaggregated and comprises 271 labor market regions. Looking at data for the years 1995 to 2002, 
the study has two main empirical findings. First, estimation of risk-sharing properties by using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as nonparametric density estimation suggests that private 
capital markets almost completely smooth out region-specific income shocks, with the German 
fiscal system providing no additional insurance. The study’s OLS results even seem to suggest that 
the fiscal system has a destabilizing effect on regional incomes.  
This paper provides new and comprehensive empirical evidence on the issue for Germany. One 
particular focus of our study is the fiscal equalization mechanism. Germany, like Canada and in 
contrast to the United States, has an explicit, formula-based mechanism for fiscal equalization, the 
Länderfinanzausgleich (LFA), and this is a particularly interesting case. The legal framework for 
the equalization mechanism is based on the constitutional principle that the states should guarantee 
their citizens similar living standards throughout the federation. Its primary focus is, therefore, on 
redistribution. However, as the literature suggests, fiscal transfer mechanisms may also play a 
stabilizing role implicitly. In contrast to a companion paper (Hepp and von Hagen (2009)), our 
focus in this paper is on the stabilization properties of factor and credit markets in addition to those 
of the fiscal system.
8 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper on Germany that 
considers all three smoothing channels simultaneously and relies on a sufficiently long post-
unification data set.  
A second focus of this paper is the comparison of risk sharing before and after German unification. 
From 1970 to 1994, only states in the former West Germany were part of the LFA. Since 1995, 
however, all German states have been included in the LFA. One of the key differences between the 
two time periods is the increased heterogeneity in per capita incomes that came with the inclusion 
                                                           
6 Following a different methodological approach, van Wincoop (1995) uses data on Japanese regions and finds that the 
correlation of consumption growth rates within Japan is similar to that on the international level. 
7 The results in these two papers differ mainly due to differences in their definitions of state income and disposable 
state income as well as differences in the time period considered. 
8 In Hepp and von Hagen (2009), we focus exclusively on the German fiscal system, but we investigate both its 
stabilization and redistributive properties. 4 
of the significantly poorer East German states in 1995. Another important difference is that, after 
unification, channeling huge, permanent transfers from West to East Germany has become a prime 
function of the German fiscal system. With the integration of East Germany, the average size of 
transfers in the fiscal equalization mechanism also increased substantially.
9 In view of this, we ask 
how unification has affected the degree of risk sharing among the states of the German federation. 
In our estimations, we find that, for the time period 1970 to 1994, the government sector (including 
social security, tax redistribution, and the fiscal equalization mechanism) was the most important 
smoothing channel with over 50 percent consumption smoothing. Slightly less than five percent of 
the smoothing effect came from the fiscal equalization mechanism. Factor markets were the other 
important channel of risk sharing, contributing around 19 percent. Finally, credit markets 
contributed another 17 percent to risk sharing. For the post-reunification period, 1995 to 2006, the 
relative importance of the three channels has changed. In the complete sample, factor markets 
contribute around 50.5 percent to risk sharing, and credit markets contribute another 17.5 percent. 
The government sector’s role is diminished: It smoothes around 10 percent of a shock. For this 
period, we also split our sample between West and East German states. In West Germany, 63 
percent of idiosyncratic income shocks are smoothed out by factor markets; and another 15 percent 
by the government sector. In East Germany, factor markets smooth about 34.5 percent of the 
volatility in state GDP, the government sector about 19 percent, and another 18 percent are 
smoothed by credit markets.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the empirical 
methodology we use to investigate the risk sharing channels in Germany. Section 3 provides a 
detailed description of our data and data sources. Our main empirical results are presented and 
interpreted in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
  2  Data 
As argued above, our study focuses on estimating the importance of factor markets, the German 
government sector, and credit markets in consumption smoothing at the state level in Germany. In 
this section, we provide a more detailed description of the variables used in the panel data analysis. 
We construct two different data sets: The first consists of annual data of the 10 West German states 
(excluding West-Berlin) from 1970 to 1994. Because of our special focus on the fiscal equalization 
mechanism (Länderfinanzausgleich) in Germany, we choose the year 1995 as the cut-off year for 
our sample. The year 1995 was the first year when the “new” states of East Germany where fully 
integrated into the fiscal equalization mechanism. Hence, the second data set contains annual data 
of all 16 German states covering the period from 1995 to 2006. Both panel data sets are balanced. 
 
First, we construct real gross domestic product per capita at the state level from our original data. 
For the 1970-1994 period, we have state-level data on aggregate real gross domestic product. The 
real GDP values in our original data are constructed by using a common national, rather than state-
specific, GDP deflator with base year 1991.
10 We then divide these aggregate values by the 
population of the state to get real per capita values. Second, we define real state income in a way 
fairly standard in this literature, namely as the sum of real net state income at factor prices per 
                                                           
9 See Hepp and von Hagen (2009) for detailed descriptive statistics of these transfers. 
10 von Hagen and Neumann (1994) show that real exchange rate variance among German states has been very low 
since the 1970s, i.e., price level changes between German states have been very similar. Hence, the use of a common 
GDP deflator should not be problematic. 5 
capita and all real tax revenues (before redistribution) with tax incidence within a state’s 
boundaries.
11 Aggregate real net state income at factor prices is provided in the data, and we obtain 
real values for the tax revenues by using the GDP deflator described previously. At this point, it is 
important to understand how the German fiscal system is structured. First, all taxes are collected 
by the states rather than the federal government. These taxes therefore include federal 
(Bundessteuern), state (Landessteuern), and local taxes (Gemeindesteuern), as well as taxes that 
are shared among all three levels of government, so-called Gemeinschaftsteuern. 
Gemeinschaftsteuern include important taxes like value added tax revenue, corporate income tax 
and personal income tax revenue. When constructing real state income per capita, we add the total 
tax incidence of these taxes, rather than only the share that remains with the state and local 
governments, since this more appropriately reflects the financial strength of a state. 
 
We construct several different versions of what we call real disposable state income per capita in 
order to be able to distinguish the role of the Länderfinanzausgleich and its components from other 
elements of the German fiscal system. The variable  n dsi  is defined as disposable income of private 
households plus the tax revenue that remains within the state and is not transferred to the federal 
and/or other state governments at stage n.
12 For example,  4 dsi  contains the disposable income of 
private households (after the contributions to and benefits from the social security system) and the 
total tax revenue
13 remaining within the state before the fiscal equalization mechanism (LFA) and. 
We then define a new disposable state income variable after each step of LFA. As prescribed by 
law, Germany’s fiscal equalization mechanism is conducted in three stages. At the first stage, VAT 
revenue is redistributed to reduce the variation in per capita VAT receipts among states. States 
with higher than national average VAT revenue per capita make transfer payments to states with 
lower than national average VAT revenue per capita in order to push either state closer to the pre-
redistribution national average per capita revenue.
14 At the second stage, states make transfer 
payments amongst each other based on a more comprehensive measure of a state’s resource needs 
and tax capacity. At the third and last stage, the federal government provides additional federal 
grants (Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) to further narrow differences in tax capacity between 
states. After the last stage of the fiscal equalization mechanism, the real disposable state income 
per capita,  1 dsi , includes the state and local share of VAT revenue that remains within the state, 
state-to-state transfers (if applicable), federal grants (again, if applicable), state taxes 
(Landessteuern), and net local taxes (Gemeindesteuern). In other words, the difference  1 () sid s i   
can be interpreted as the combined effects of the social security system, transfer of federal (shares 
of) taxes, and the fiscal equalization mechanism. Finally, we define real state consumption per 
capita  i c as the sum of real private and public per-capita consumption in state i. 
 
Data on gross domestic product, net national income at factor prices, population, private and public 
consumption for 1970-1994 was provided to us by the Statistisches Landesamt Baden-
Württemberg (1998). For the period 1995-2006, we use national accounting data provided online 
by the German federal and state statistical offices (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 
(2008)) which was computed using a standardized European Union methodology (ESVG1995). 
Data on tax revenues before and after redistribution come from publications of the German federal 
                                                           
11 Net state income at factor prices here corresponds to net national income at factor prices in national accounting 
data. 
12 In the German official data, disposable income of private households is defined as household income after taxes 
and social security payments or receipts. 
13 At this point, all federal taxes, and the federal share of income and local taxes are netted out here. 
14 A more detailed description of the fiscal equalization mechanism in Germany can be found in Hepp and von Hagen 
(2001). 6 
statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt (1977, 1989, 2000)). Data on VAT redistribution and 
state-to-state transfers is from annual publications of the Bundesrat (Bundesrat). Tax data for the 
years 1995 to 2002 was provided by the Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg, data for the 
years 2003 to 2006 is available online from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt). As previously described, in the data set covering the years 1970 to 1994, all nominal 
variables are converted into real values with the aforementioned national GDP deflator with base 
year 1991, and then divided by the state’s population to get per capita values. In contrast, nominal 
and real values for a state’s gross domestic product, its private and public consumption are 
available for the 1995 to 2006 time period. They are converted from nominal to real values by 
(different)  state-specific deflators for each of the three series. For the conversion of all other 
variables into real values, we use the state-specific GDP deflator with base year 1991. 
 
  3  Methodology 
We follow the framework of Asdrubali et al. (1996) to investigate the importance of different 
channels for risk sharing at the state level in Germany. We focus on three main channels, i.e., 
factor markets
15, the government sector, and private credit markets.
16 For the government sector, 
we distinguish between the effect of individual components of the German tax and transfer system 
and all of them combined.








  (1) 
where  i gdp  is the gross domestic product of state i,  i si  is state income,  i dsi  is disposable state 
income, and  i c  is state consumption.
18 We then perform a period-by-period decomposition of the 
cross-sectional variance in state gross domestic product. To do that, we take logs and differences 
of equation (1), multiply both sides by  log( ) gdp   and take expectations to obtain 
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Dividing both sides by the variance of  log( ) gdp  , we get:  
 
 1 FGCU     (3) 
    
                                                           
15 In contrast to Asdrubali et al. (1996) who call the smoothing channel from state GDP to state income “capital 
markets”, we call it “factor markets The reason is that in addition to cross-ownership of productive assets, many 
workers are working in neighboring states (this is especially true for city states and their neighbors), contributing to the 
neighboring state’s GDP while generating net factor income for their state of residence which is included in state 
income. 
16 For a detailed description of the mechanics of each of these smoothing channels, see Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
17 These components include social security, unemployment and pension benefits/payments, tax redistribution, and the 
components of the German Länderfinanzausgleich (redistribution of state share of VAT revenue, state-to-state 
transfers, and federal grants). 
18 A more detailed description of these variables can be found in section 2. 7 
where the  ’s are ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. Here,  F   is the OLS estimate of the 
slope in the regression of ( log( ) log( )) gdp si    on  log( ) gdp  . Full risk sharing through factor 
markets alone corresponds to  1 F   , implying that state income si is unaffected by changes in 
state gross domestic product gdp; i.e. there is no co-movement of state income and state gross 
domestic product. In contrast,  0 F    implies perfect co-movement of state income and state gross 
domestic product; in this case, factor markets do not contribute to consumption smoothing. The 
coefficients  G   and  C   are interpreted similarly.  U   is the “unsmoothed” part of the variance of 
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where the cross-sectional dimension is states of the German Federal Republic and  ,t   are time 
fixed effects. They are included to capture shocks to the growth rate of aggregate (national) gross 
domestic product. 
 
In a second and third set of regressions, we sharpen the focus on the risk sharing effects of the 
various components of the German government sector. For that purpose, we define disposable state 
income in different ways
21: as disposable state income after transfer of federal (share of) taxes and 
social security, but before any transfer payments/receipts triggered by the German 
Länderfinanzausgleich have been made ( 4 dsi ); and as disposable state income after these transfers 
have taken place ( 1 dsi ). For this scenario, we run the following five panel regressions:  
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Finally, when we also distinguish disposable state income after each of the three stages of the 
German Länderfinanzausgleich, we run the following set of regressions:  
                                                           
19  Alternatively, as described in ASY, the coefficients represent the fraction of shocks to a state’s GDP smoothed by a 
particular channel. For example, βF=0.43 means that 43 percent of a shock to a state’s GDP is smoothed by factor 
markets. In our paper, we would sometimes describe that as “43 percent risk sharing”. 
20 As in Asdrubali et al. (1996), our coefficient estimates are not restricted to be positive. A negative coefficient 
implies dis-smoothing of the respective channel. 
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where time fixed effects  ,t   are included again. The N different  n dsi -terms represent disposable 
state income after a particular component of the government sector has been taken into account. 
 
Given the nature of our data, several econometric issues need to be addressed before estimating 
equations  (4),  (5), and (6). We find evidence for panel-specific heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation across panels in the error matrix. Furthermore, the error terms appear 
to be serially correlated. In order to deal with these issues, Asdrubali et al. (1996) use feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) in their equation-by-equation estimation. According to Beck and 
Katz (1995, 1996), it is problematic to apply FGLS to this type of economic data, however. Their 
Monte Carlo simulations show that standard errors are seriously underestimated using FGLS, 
thereby providing overconfidence in the significance of the estimated parameters. Furthermore, the 
correction for contemporaneously correlated errors requires that the number of years T in a sample 
is at least as large as the number of cross-sectional units N. This requirement is not fulfilled for 
some of our sub-samples. And even for the full sample, each element of the covariance matrix of 
the errors would be estimated based on very few observations. For these reasons, Beck and Katz 
suggest the use of an ordinary least squares approach with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
instead. Their Monte Carlo simulations show that the error terms estimated in this way are very 
accurate, even when the error structures in the panel are complicated. Given the presence of panel-
specific heteroskedasticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation in our data, our preferred 
approach is therefore to use ordinary least squares estimation with panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) as introduced by Beck and Katz (1995). 
 
  4  Results 
In this section, we present and interpret the results from estimating the regressions (4), (5), and (6), 
using ordinary least squares with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). We will also estimate 
these equations by interacting our explanatory variable  log( ) it gdp   with a dummy variable for 
city states and small states, respectively. The dummy variable  i city  equals one, if a state is a city 
state, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable smalli equals one if a (non-city) state’s economic 
size (measured by absolute GDP) is relatively small, and zero otherwise.
22. These dummies 
indicate the additional degree of consumption smoothing obtained by small and city states, 
respectively. They and allow us to test whether or not city states and small states benefit from 
more risk sharing than the large states. Our regression setup in (4) is similar to that in Asdrubali et 
al. (1996). We distinguish between the following channels of consumption smoothing here: factor 
markets ( F  ), the government sector ( G  ), credit markets ( C  ), and the unsmoothed part ( U  ).  
                                                           
22 For a list of states and their categorization, see table 5. 9 
 
In table 1, we present the results for the sample period 1970 to 1994, which includes only the ten 
states of West Germany. We start with estimating the regressions (4) one by one. The most 
effective consumption smoothing channel is the government sector which smoothes about 54 
percent of the volatility of GDP, followed by factor markets with almost 20 percent. The 
consumption smoothing effect of credit markets is statistically significant at about 17 percent. 
About 9 percent of GDP volatility is not smoothed. As explained earlier, consumption smoothing 
by the government sector is achieved here by a combination of taxation, social security 
contributions/benefits, and the fiscal equalization mechanism. Next, we investigate consumption 
smoothing through the government sector more closely by considering disposable state income 
before the fiscal equalization mechanism separately (eq. (5)). We find that taxation and social 
security contributions/benefits contribute about 50 percent to consumption smoothing. The 
coefficient for the fiscal equalization mechanism is at about five percent, but is not statistically 
significant. However, further investigation of the individual components of the fiscal equalization 
mechanism (eq.(6)) reveals that state-to-state transfers contribute about 5 percent to consumption 
smoothing, and redistribution of VAT revenue another 3.6 percent. The coefficient on federal 
grants is negative (but statistically not significant), implying a destabilizing role of federal grants. 
 
Given the special treatment of city states in the fiscal equalization mechanism and the 
heterogeneity of the size of German states, we control for both city states and small states. The 
results are presented in columns 4 to 6 in table 1.  The results from a modified version of equation 
(6) show that the importance of different channels of consumption smoothing is independent of 
state size with only a few exceptions.
23 Similar to the previous results, credit markets contribute 
around 17.5 percent of consumption smoothing for all states. The contribution of factor markets is 
smaller for large and city states with about 12.4 percent, but larger for small states with about 25.1 
percent. Splitting the fiscal system into the transfer of federal tax (share)/social security and the 
components of the fiscal equalization mechanism reveals that the former is the main consumption 
smoothing channel. Of the components of the fiscal equalization mechanism’ VAT revenue 
distribution and state-to-state transfers contribute about four and five percent to consumption 
smoothing, respectively, independent of state size. Federal grants seem to be marginally 
destabilizing for large and city states, and significantly so for small states with about negative six 
percent. 
 
We now turn our focus to data from the post-unification period 1995 to 2006. First, we will 
consider the full sample including all 16 German states. As can be seen in table 2, both factor and 
credit markets contribute significantly to consumption smoothing with 50.5 and 17.5 percent, 
respectively. The government sector’s contribution is only around ten percent with no contribution 
from the fiscal equalization mechanism, however. Thus, unification has reversed the role of 
markets and the government in providing consumption smoothing. Overall, approximately 21 
percent of regional shocks are unsmoothed, much more than in Germany before unification. We 
also ran regressions with interactive explanatory variables controlling for state size. In the last 
column we report the χ
2 statistic testing for joint significance of the coefficients of the interactive 
variables for small and city states together of these modified regressions. Only the smoothing 
effects of state-to-state transfers differ between large states and all other states. 
 
Given the stark economic differences between West and East German states and the ongoing 
integration process of former East Germany into West Germany, we divide our sample and look at 
both sub-sets of states separately. In doing so, we now measure the degree of consumption 
                                                           
23 Regression results for modified versions of equations (4) and (5) are not reported, but are available upon request. 10 
smoothing for East German states around an average East German level of consumption, and the 
degree of consumption smoothing for West German states around an average West German level 
of consumption, allowing for the possibility that the difference between the two reference levels of 
consumption is driven by other shocks.  
 
Starting with the results for East Germany in table 3, we see that all three channels contribute 
(statistically significantly) to consumption smoothing. Factor markets contribute with about 34 
percent, the government sector with about 20 percent, and credit markets with around 18 percent. 
About 24 percent of income volatility is unsmoothed. When we further divide the government 
sector up into its components, we find that only the coefficient for the fiscal equalization 
mechanism is significant and contributes about 7.6 percent to consumption smoothing. In 
particular, the VAT revenue contributes about five percent to consumption smoothing. Including 
an interactive dummy variable for Berlin reveals that it is the main benefactor of VAT revenue 
redistribution (see the χ
2 statistic in the last column).
24 
 
Turning to West Germany for the post-unification period, we see in table 4, that factor markets are 
by far the most important smoothing channel with a contribution of about 63 percent. The 
government sector overall contributes merely 16.7 percent, mainly via social security. In fact, the 
fiscal equalization mechanism does not seem to contribute significantly. Distinguishing by state 
size (see the χ
2 statistic in the last column) does not alter these results. Only state-to-state transfers 
to small states are less effective than state-to-state transfers to other states.
25 Interestingly, the 
share of unsmoothed shocks among the West German states is only 13 percent, which is close to 
the pre-unification value and is considerably less than the share of unsmoothed shocks in East 
Germany. 
 
  5  Conclusion 
Our empirical analysis explores the channels of consumption smoothing, with a special focus on 
the fiscal equalization mechanism in Germany, using data from 1970 to 2006, and hence covering 
pre- and post-unification Germany. Several interesting findings emerge. When we focus on the 
time period 1970 to 1994, we find that the government sector plays the most important role in 
smoothing income volatility. Our estimate of 54 percent of consumption smoothing smoothing 
provided by the government sector is significantly higher than Asdrubali’s et al. (1996) result for 
the US of 23 percent for the 1964 to 1990 time period. At the same time, the contribution of factor 
markets is about half as big in Germany compared to the US (19.5 percent vs. 39 percent). After 
1995, when East Germany is included in our sample, our results indicate that all three channels of 
consumption smoothing – factor markets, credit markets, and the government sector – contribute 
significantly. Now, however, factor markets contribute the most to consumptionsmoothing with 
about 50 percent. Since the post-unification data time period is relatively short, it will be 
interesting to see whether the factor markets will retain their important role as an 
consumptionsmoothing channel.  
For the entire sample, the contribution of the fiscal equalization mechanism to consumption 
smoothing is relatively small. Itscontribution is typically less than five percent. Hence, the 
mechanism contributes little to overall consumption smoothing. Most of the consumption 
                                                           
24 All East German states fall into the category “small state” except Berlin, which is a city state (see table 5). 
25 As a robustness check, all regressions in section 4 were also run with state fixed effects. The results did not differ 
much quantitatively and not at all qualitatively. We also distinguished between positive and negative shocks to state 
income to see whether there is asymmetry in the effectiveness of the risk sharing channels. The results were 
inconclusive, however. 11 
smoothing provided by the public sector  is accomplished through the social security system and 
unemployment insurance. 
Earlier studies have pointed out that German unification has changed the nature of Germany’s 
federal fiscal system, which has become a mechanism for large-scale transfers from West to East 
Germany. Our results show that another effect of this change has been that the public sector lost 
much of its effectiveness as a risk-sharing device among the West German states, a fact that has 
been unnoticed so far. While the overall degree of risk-sharing among the West German states has 
remained the same after unification, most of this is now being provided by factor markets. It is 
plausible that risk-sharing provided by factor markets puts more emphasis on (regional or sectoral) 
labor mobility than government provided risk-sharing, and that it leaves households who do not 
own diversified portfolios of financial assets with less protection against region-specific shocks 
than others. If so, the loss of publicly provided risk-sharing may have added to the dissatisfaction 
of West German households with the outcomes of German unification.  
Similarly, it is plausible to assume that East German households were largely sheltered against 
region-specific economic shocks under the socialist system. Since German unification, public 
protection against such shocks in East Germany has been on the order of only 20 percent, while 24 
percent of regional shocks are unsmoothed. Thus, these households face more economic risk than 
before, a fact which may explain why there is much dissatisfaction in spite of the large transfers 
received in that part of Germany, too. 12 
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  6  Tables 
 
Table 1: Consumption smoothing in Germany, PCSE regression results, 1970-1994. 
 
                     modified eq. (6) 
Eq. (4)  Eq. (5)  Eq. (6)  Large  Small  City 
                     (Default)       
(F) Factor markets  0.195 0.195 0.195 0.124  0.127  0.113 
(0.068)*** (0.068)*** (0.068)***  (0.071)*  (0.071)*  (0.092) 
(G) Government sector,   0.541 
      overall  (0.105)*** 
(G.1) Transfer of federal tax  0.5 0.5  0.541  -0.101  -0.04 
         (share) and social security  (0.096)*** (0.096)*** (0.097)***  (0.072)  (0.134) 
(G.2) Fiscal Equalization  0.048 
        Mechanism, overall  (0.043) 
(G.2.1) VAT revenue  0.036 0.039  -0.021  0.009 
           redistribution  (0.019)* (0.020)*  (0.024)  (0.025) 
(G.2.2) state-to-state  0.05 0.051  0  -0.004 
           transfers  (0.014)*** (0.014)***  (0.005)  (0.018) 
(G.2.3) federal grants  -0.044 -0.004  -0.055  -0.069 
(0.035) (0.036)  (0.026)**  (0.049) 
(C) Credit markets  0.173 0.173 0.173 0.175  0.051  -0.067 
(0.081)** (0.081)** (0.081)** (0.079)**  (0.055)  (0.100) 
(U) Unsmoothed  0.085 0.085 0.085 0.089  -0.017  0 
(0.042)** (0.042)** (0.042)** (0.043)**  (0.032)  (0.045) 
  
                          
Observations  240 240 240  240 
No. of states  10 10 10  10 
                             
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Panel-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses, and time-fixed effects are omitted. The sample data consists of all ten West German states (excluding West-Berlin) for the 
time period 1970 to 1994. 
We perform a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation controlling for panel-specific heterogeneity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and common first-order serial correlation. The regression equations for the three columns are described in equations (4), (5), and (6) in the 
text, respectively. The coefficients describe the consumption smoothing effect of the respective channel listed in the lead column. 
The regression results reported in the last three columns are from a modified version of (6) in the text with the added interactive 
explanatory variables  log( ) it i gdp small   and  log( ) it i gdp city  . The coefficients of these interactive terms describe the difference of the 
consumption smoothing effect of the respective channel for small and city states, respectively, relative to that for large states, listed in 
column 4. 16 
Table 2: Consumption smoothing in Germany, PCSE regression results, 1995-2006. 
 
                       
Eq. (4)  Eq. (5)  Eq. (6)  χ
2 
                       
(F) Factor markets  0.505 0.505 0.505  2.54 
(0.074)*** (0.074)*** (0.074)***  (0.281) 
(G) Government sector,   0.114 2.35 
      overall  (0.072) (0.308) 
(G.1) Transfer of federal tax  0.103 0.103  4.48 
         (share) and social security  (0.059)* (0.059)*  (0.106) 
(G.2) Fiscal Equalization     0.02  0.24 
        Mechanism, overall  (0.035) (0.889) 
(G.2.1) VAT revenue  0.008 0.1 
           redistribution  (0.024) (0.952) 
(G.2.2) state-to-state  0.008 5.64 
           transfers  (0.013) (0.060)* 
(G.2.3) federal grants  -0.001 4.24 
(0.029) (0.120) 
(C) Credit markets  0.175 0.175 0.175  0.78 
(0.056)*** (0.056)*** (0.056)***  (0.676) 
(U) Unsmoothed  0.208 0.208 0.208  0.99 
(0.069)*** (0.069)*** (0.069)***  (0.610) 
  
                    
Observations  176 176 176 
No. of states  16 16 16 
                       
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Panel-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses, and time-fixed effects are omitted. The sample data consists of all 16 German states for the time period from 1995 to 2006. 
We perform a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation controlling for panel-specific heterogeneity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and common first-order serial correlation. The regression equations for the three columns are described in equations (4), (5), and (6) in the 
text, respectively. The coefficients describe the consumption smoothing effect of the respective channel listed in the lead column.  
The χ
2-statistic reported in the last column tests the joint significance of the added interactive explanatory variables  log( ) it i gdp small   
and  log( ) it i gdp city   included into a modified version of (6) in the text. Its p-value is reported in parentheses. If we get a significant 
statistic, then the respective smoothing channel for small and city states together is different from that of large states. 17 
Table 3: Consumption smoothing in Germany, PCSE regression results, 1995-2006, East 
Germany. 
 
                       
Eq. (4)  Eq. (5)  Eq. (6)  χ
2 
                       
(F) Factor markets  0.345 0.345 0.345  0.21 
(0.105)*** (0.105)*** (0.105)***  (0.646) 
(G) Government sector,   0.198 0.35 
      overall  (0.086)** (0.553) 
(G.1) Transfer of federal tax  0.121 0.121 0.1 
         (share) and social security  (0.078) (0.078)  (0.749) 
(G.2) Fiscal Equalization  0.076 1.83 
        Mechanism, overall  (0.025)*** (0.177) 
(G.2.1) VAT revenue  0.05 4.33 
           redistribution  (0.024)** (0.038)** 
(G.2.2) state-to-state  0.021 0.11 
           transfers  (0.017) (0.742) 
(G.2.3) federal grants  0.005 0.75 
(0.006) (0.388) 
(C) Credit markets  0.178 0.178 0.178  1.51 
(0.069)** (0.069)** (0.069)** (0.220) 
(U) Unsmoothed  0.244 0.244 0.244  0.88 
(0.099)** (0.099)** (0.099)** (0.348) 
  
                    
Observations  66 66 66 
No. of states  6 6 6 
                       
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Panel-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses, and time-fixed effects are omitted. The sample data consists of the five East German states and Berlin for the time period 1995 
to 2006. 
We perform a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation controlling for panel-specific heterogeneity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and common first-order serial correlation. The regression equations for columns the three columns are described in equations (4), (5), and 
(6) in the text, respectively. The coefficients describe the consumption smoothing effect of the respective channel listed in the lead column.  
The χ
2-statistic reported in the last column tests the joint significance of the added interactive explanatory variables  log( ) it i gdp small   
and  log( ) it i gdp city   included into a modified version of (6) in the text. Its p-value is reported in parentheses. If we get a significant 
statistic, then the respective smoothing channel  for small and city states together is different from that of large states. 
 18 
Table 4: Consumption smoothing in Germany, PCSE regression results, 1995-2006, West 
Germany. 
 
                       
Eq. (4)  Eq. (5)  Eq. (6)  χ
2 
                       
(F) Factor markets  0.632 0.632 0.632  1.71 
(0.110)*** (0.110)*** (0.110)***  (0.426) 
(G) Government sector,   0.167 3.54 
      overall  (0.097)* (0.171) 
(G.1) Transfer of federal tax  0.139 0.139  4.08 
         (share) and social security  (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.130) 
(G.2) Fiscal Equalization  0.044 2.35 
        Mechanism, overall  (0.057) (0.309) 
(G.2.1) VAT revenue  -0.003 3.39 
           redistribution  (0.035) (0.184) 
(G.2.2) state-to-state  0.005 6.44 
           transfers  (0.025) (0.040)** 
(G.2.3) federal grants  0.035 1.18 
(0.031) (0.555) 
(C) Credit markets  0.083 0.083 0.083  0.71 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)  (0.700) 
(U) Unsmoothed  0.134 0.134 0.134  0.91 
(0.072)* (0.072)* (0.072)*  (0.633) 
  
                    
Observations  110 110 110 
No. of states  10 10 10 
                       
 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Panel-corrected standard errors are in 
parentheses, and time-fixed effects are omitted. The sample data consists of the ten West German states (excluding Berlin) for the time 
period 1995 to 2006. 
We perform a panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation controlling for panel-specific heterogeneity, contemporaneous correlation, 
and common first-order serial correlation. The regression equations for the three columns are described in equations (4), (5), and (6) in the 
text, respectively. The coefficients describe the consumption smoothing effect of the respective channel listed in the lead column.  
The χ
2-statistic reported in the last column tests the joint significance of the added interactive explanatory variables  log( ) it i gdp small   and 
log( ) it i gdp city   included into a modified version of (6) in the text. Its p-value is reported in parentheses. If we get a significant 
statistic, then the respective smoothing channel for small and city states together is different from that of large states. 
 19 
Table 5: German states in the sample. 
 
        
West     East 
        
    
Bayern   Berlin  (C) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg   Brandenburg  (S) 
Bremen (C)    Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (S) 
Hamburg (C)    Sachsen (S) 
Hessen     Sachsen-Anhalt (S) 
Niedersachsen   Thüringen  (S) 
Nordrhein-Westfalen    
Rheinland-Pfalz (S)     
Saarland (S)     
Schleswig-Holstein (S)     
        
 
Notes: C indicates a city state, and S indicates a small state.  20 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics, West Germany, 1970-2005. 
         








variation Minimum Maximum 
                      
         
Gross state product  1970  13548.97 3604.77 0.266 10673.85 22174.13 1991 22916.64 4669.97 0.204 18889.94 33844.66 
State income    14195.53 5408.07 0.381 10272.94 27717.71 22334.62 5292.63 0.237 16672.55 35536.75 
Disp. state income    9680.46 1207.81 0.125 8586.92 12747.43 16412.53 1869.38 0.114 13905.00 19793.93 
State consumption    9232.39 713.70 0.077 8503.96 10919.47 16086.26 1614.45 0.100 13977.14 18900.09 
Private consumption   6732.17 548.29 0.081 6164.64 7989.94 12170.55 1343.16 0.110 10240.42 14510.24 
Public consumption   2500.23 173.34 0.069 2339.32 2929.53 3915.72 308.87 0.079 3627.95 4565.05 
     
Gross state product  1975  15001.89 3875.11 0.258 11941.16 24355.12 1995 22740.56 4796.40 0.211 18551.15 34143.84 
State income    15643.49 5741.14 0.367 11547.85 30235.45 22271.77 5381.75 0.242 16978.89 36571.74 
Disp. state income    11280.04 1203.68 0.107 10368.64 14442.25 16242.27 1620.42 0.100 14780.63 19329.11 
State consumption    10862.22 741.42 0.068 10123.68 12655.37 16565.35 1318.65 0.080 15090.17 19047.98 
Private consumption   7809.03 518.61 0.066 7262.19 9072.72 12602.01 1011.13 0.080 11289.47 14521.36 
Public consumption   3053.18 244.82 0.080 2835.29 3582.65 3963.33 345.01 0.087 3700.50 4665.99 
     
Gross state product  1980  17673.53 4488.72 0.254 14222.43 28444.22 2000 24919.32 5473.76 0.220 19765.83 37107.45 
State income    18426.57 6549.82 0.355 13727.72 35102.05 24431.72 5803.83 0.238 19423.52 39535.30 
Disp. state income    13105.81 1142.96 0.087 12154.33 16162.29 17748.26 1782.84 0.100 15916.67 21261.20 
State consumption    12768.21 822.37 0.064 11842.75 14735.18 17893.22 1515.84 0.085 16569.72 20703.39 
Private consumption   9286.62 549.91 0.059 8667.08 10660.09 13624.23 1165.07 0.086 12605.19 15667.04 
Public consumption   3481.59 321.58 0.092 3175.68 4075.09 4269.00 378.59 0.089 3934.80 5036.35 
     
Gross state product  1985  18860.98 4985.44 0.264 14963.99 31491.15 2005 25445.96 5669.02 0.223 19898.94 37675.02 
State income    19293.36 6913.266 0.358 13970.42 37195.14 24797.98 6409.94 0.258 19454.33 41941.95 
Disp. state income    13692.17 1089.948 0.080 12343.83 16390.16 18168.76 1764.28 0.097 16359.13 22079.05 
State consumption    13350.56 785.799 0.059 12427.21 15194.87 18183.98 1679.63 0.092 16600.94 22124.22 
Private consumption   9613.24 514.107 0.053 8993.64 10769.54 13893.85 1456.71 0.105 12623.33 17240.65 
Public consumption   3737.33 351.484 0.094 3433.57 4425.333 4290.12 247.29 0.058 3977.61 4883.57 
                             
Note: The means of the variables in the table are calculated as unweighted means. All numbers are expressed in 1991 euros. 21 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics, Germany, 1995-2006. 
 
     




of variation Minimum  Maximum
                
        
Gross state product  1991  17755.29 8208.17 0.462 6625.18 33844.66
State income    ....  .
Disp. state income    ....  .
State consumption    13962.63 3409.85 0.244 9051.41 18900.09
Private consumption    10359.05 2841.70 0.274 6203.64 14510.24
Public consumption    3603.59 599.83 0.166 2725.53 4565.05
     
Gross state product  1995  18965.38 6594.56 0.348 10641.35 34143.84
State income    18229.39 7115.22 0.390 9487.89 36571.74
Disp. state income    14442.59 2923.56 0.202 10465.30 19329.11
State consumption    15176.36 2393.35 0.158 11849.49 19047.98
Private consumption    11054.79 2399.88 0.217 7582.12 14521.36
Public consumption    4121.57 386.14 0.094 3700.50 5011.48
     
Gross state product  2000  20766.21 7176.32 0.346 12169.30 37107.45
State income    19844.47 7767.56 0.391 10422.15 39535.30
Disp. state income    15861.06 2984.34 0.188 11857.91 21261.20
State consumption    16427.13 2430.62 0.148 13239.09 20703.39
Private consumption    12070.13 2352.54 0.195 8789.37 15667.04
Public consumption    4357.01 376.46 0.086 3934.80 5184.60
     
Gross state product  2005  21325.95 7132.18 0.334 13208.54 37675.02
State income    20112.34 8079.85 0.402 10749.65 41941.95
Disp. state income    16195.63 3026.86 0.187 12028.27 22079.05
State consumption    16535.92 2660.94 0.161 13166.74 22124.22
Private consumption    12218.94 2566.29 0.210 8875.94 17240.65
Public consumption    4316.97 271.92 0.063 3977.61 5006.38
              
Note: The means of the variables in the table are calculated as unweighted means. All numbers are expressed in 1991 
euros. 22 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics, East Germany, 1995-2006. 
 
     




of variation Minimum  Maximum
                
        
Gross state product  1991  9153.04 4559.52 0.498 6625.18 18427.46
State income    ....  .
Disp. state income    ....  .
State consumption    10423.25 2477.35 0.238 9051.41 15456.55
Private consumption    7339.88 1864.65 0.254 6203.64 11108.34
Public consumption    3083.37 622.94 0.202 2725.53 4348.21
     
Gross state product  1995  12673.42 3611.69 0.285 10641.35 19981.02
State income    11492.07 3548.75 0.309 9487.89 18641.37
Disp. state income    11443.11 1908.23 0.167 10465.30 15317.31
State consumption    12861.39 1940.36 0.151 11849.49 16805.54
Private consumption    8476.09 1634.18 0.193 7582.12 11794.06
Public consumption    4385.30 315.45 0.072 4173.13 5011.48
     
Gross state product  2000  13844.36 2928.48 0.212 12169.30 19794.40
State income    12199.05 2853.83 0.234 10422.15 17924.78
Disp. state income    12715.73 1415.17 0.111 11857.91 15570.90
State consumption    13983.64 1457.41 0.104 13239.09 16952.41
Private consumption    9479.96 1130.88 0.119 8789.37 11767.81
Public consumption    4503.68 354.77 0.079 4177.84 5184.60
     
Gross state product  2005  14459.28 2055.59 0.142 13208.54 18549.27
State income    12302.94 2190.90 0.178 10749.65 16654.78
Disp. state income    12907.09 1057.76 0.082 12028.27 14978.74
State consumption    13789.15 1295.31 0.094 13166.74 16428.22
Private consumption    9427.42 988.04 0.105 8875.94 11421.84
Public consumption    4361.73 328.48 0.075 4124.56 5006.38
              
Note: The means of the variables in the table are calculated as unweighted means . All numbers are expressed in 1991 
euros. 2008
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